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This paper analyzes labor market institutions convergence in the European Union (EU) to test 
for economic integration of the EU countries. The convergence is analyzed for five indicators 
of labor market institutions: employment protection legislation index (EPL), tax wedge, 
unemployment benefits, active labor market policies, and minimum wages. Convergence is 
measured using standard beta and sigma convergence complemented with a more sophisticated 
and more flexible approach of the log-t regression. Annual data for the EU countries from 1993 
to 2018 is considered, depending on availability. The results suggest there is no convergence in 
labor market institutions between EU member states. The differences between institutions are 
still substantial, and the labor market institutions are changing too slowly to converge. The 
empirical analysis also considers a possibility of club convergence, differentiating between 
endogenous clubs based on clustering algorithm and exogenous clubs based on geographical 
proximity and labor market similarities. Convergence is present only in endogenous clubs. Such 
results imply different long-run steady states where the differences between countries may be 
substantial. Since labor market institutions are fundamental determinants of employment and 
unemployment, differences found in labor market institutions suggest that levels of 




labor market, institutions, convergence, club convergence, clustering algorithm 
 
JEL classification 





A common conclusion by economic analysts and international organizations such as the European 
Commission, the OECD, and the IMF is that the main cause of high unemployment during the 21st 
century in developed European countries is due to labor market institutions.  
This paper analyzes labor market integration within the European Union. Given the importance of the 
labor market institutions on the overall labor market outcomes, the paper analyzes the convergence of 
the labor market institutions. We also consider convergence clubs, allowing for the possibility that 
groups of countries converge to different steady states. The convergence of labor market institutions 
would imply that labor markets of the EU member states are approaching the common steady state, thus 
being integrated. On the other hand, convergence clubs or lack of convergence would suggest weak 
labor market integration. In that case, labor market outcomes such as employment and unemployment 
rates may substantially differ between the EU member states. In the long run, they could even move 
further away. 
We consider five different labor market institution indicators over the period from 1993 to 2018. They 
are employment protection legislation index (EPL), tax wedge, unemployment benefits, active labor 
market policies, and minimum wages. They cover the most important properties of labor markets, such 
as labor market rigidity, different employment policy measures as well as labor taxation. Labor market 
institutions have become extremely important during the COVID-19 crisis. To control the spreading of 
the virus, the European governments introduced various restrictions and temporarily closed many 
businesses. On the other hand, to reimburse the workers and owners of the affected businesses, the 
governments extensively used labor market institutions and policies. This is in line with the “act fast 
and do whatever it takes” prescription by the leading economists (Baldwin and Weder di Mauro, 2020).  
Prominent multi-national institutions began to aggressively promote the need for large-scale labor 
market deregulation in the early 1990s, most notably in the OECD’s (1994) massive Jobs Study and in 
the IMF’s (2003) Unemployment and Labor Market Institutions: Why Reforms Pay Off. They have 
argued that these institutions have created rigidities that account for the relatively slow employment 
growth and persistently high unemployment experienced by much of the developed world over the last 
two decades (Baker et al., 2004, p. 1). Most of the studies suggest that institutional rigidities are indeed 
responsible for the poor performance of labor markets (Lehmann, Muravyev, 2012, p. 237). The new 
orthodoxy (Freeman, 2005) makes the deregulation of labor market institutions accompanied by high 
employment and wage flexibility the keys to economic success. Freeman (2005) stresses four 
recommendations for labor market deregulation: increased flexibility of working time; making wage 
and labor costs more flexible by removing restrictions; reforming employment security provisions, and 
reforming unemployment and related benefit systems (Freeman, 2005, p. 131). Therefore, countries with 
high unemployment have been repeatedly told that they must undertake comprehensive structural 
reforms to reduce "labor market rigidities", such as generous unemployment benefit systems, too strong 
unions, high employment protection (for example, high redundancy costs), high minimum wages, non-
competitive mechanism of wage settings, or serious tax distortions. 
Given that labor markets operate in conditions of market imperfection, they require certain actions of 
institutions and an appropriate mix of different regulations, taxes, or subsidies that affect the relationship 
between workers and employers. Some of the so-called rigidities may represent rough institutional 
corrections for other distortions in the labor market. Some institutions may be bad for productivity, 
output, and welfare, but may not lead to an increase in unemployment (Blanchard, Wolfers, 2000, p. 
12). Therefore, there is a broad consensus that the introduction of appropriate "rigidities" is desirable. 
The question is what the „appropriate“ institutions are or how much rigidity is desirable? What are the 
consequences of deficient institutions, and what are the gains from their repair? The IMF research has 
shown that well-designed labor market reforms can lead to an increase in output of about 5% and a drop 
in the unemployment rate of about 3 percentage points (IMF, 2003, p. 129). In doing so, reforms must 
be comprehensive because partial reforms may be less effective, especially if the labor market is 
uncompetitive. Therefore, it is very important to explore the relationship between labor market 
institutions and labor market performance in terms of employment and unemployment. 
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Individual institutions in the labor market usually do not act autonomously. Their impact on 
employment, unemployment, wages, and productivity mainly interacts with other labor market 
institutions. Often one institution is introduced in order to cancel some undesirable effects of another 
institution. For example, active labor market policy measures have been introduced to reduce the 
disincentive or sometimes discriminatory effects associated with the introduction of unemployment 
benefits. Occasionally it is optimal to do the above because different instruments are needed to achieve 
different goals 
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the convergence of labor market institutions in the 
EU. The convergence of labor market institutions would imply they are becoming more integrated. That 
would be a step forward to labor market integration in the EU as well. We analyze the convergence of 
five labor market institutions indicators using different convergence test. Besides commonly used beta 
and sigma convergence, we also test the convergence using a more sophisticated and more flexible 
approach proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) based on the log-t regression. It fixes problems with 
the traditional beta and sigma convergence tests that may be biased and have low power, as shown in 
Bernard and Durlauf (1995, 1996). However, the results of different convergence tests are robust in our 
case, showing no absolute or conditional convergence in labor market institutions. We also analyze 
different convergence clubs, which are endogenously determined by the clustering algorithm of Phillips 
and Sul (2007, 2009), or exogenously determined by geographical proximity and labor market 
similarities. Club convergence is of special importance, as it suggests that groups of countries converge 
to different steady-state, implying weak labor market integration. 
The main results can be summarized as follows. We do not find firm evidence of convergence in labor 
market institutions. The results are robust when we look for absolute and conditional convergence, and 
results are robust to different methodologies. The main conclusion of this part of the analysis is that 
labor market institutions do not converge within the European Union. The differences between 
institutions are still significant, and they slow down the labor market institution convergence and 
integration. 
Results regarding club convergence show that countries converge to different endogenously determined 
clubs. The number of clubs depends on the labor market institutions indicator. There are two 
convergence clubs in minimum wages, three in employment protection legislation and tax wedge, and 
four and five clubs in active and passive labor market policies, respectively. Convergence clubs are 
heterogeneous, and countries in clubs do not share common geographical, political, or development 
similarities as commonly expected. For comparison, we group countries into intuitive (exogenous) 
clubs, Mediterranean, Continental, Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon and Eastern. The results of the log-t 
regression firmly reject convergence for all clubs except the Mediterranean (in case of tax wedge and 
minimum wages) and Anglo-Saxon (in case of EPL index and tax wedge). It suggests that convergence 
clubs indeed exist, but they are not as intuitive as expected.  Since labor market institutions are 
fundamental determinants of employment and unemployment, differences we find in labor market 
institutions suggest that levels of employment and unemployment in the EU will hardly converge, 
implying weak labor market integration. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews results from the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the convergence of labor market variables and explains the importance of several labor 
market institutions. Section three describes data and methodology. Section four presents the main 
results, while section five concludes. 
2. Literature review 
The literature review is organized into two parts. First, we focus on the convergence of different 
macroeconomic variables. The existing literature focused mainly on the analysis of economic growth, 
prices, production, productivity, and unemployment. As this literature review shows, the existing 
literature has not analyzed the convergence of the labor market institutions in the EU countries in a way 
that consistently connects it with the problems of deeper integration of the labor markets. This paper 
bridges that literature gap. The second part concentrates on labor market institutions in the EU and their 
rigidities in order to address their connection with labor market performance.  
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2.1. Convergence in the EU 
Economic convergence has been at the center of research for many years, especially within the European 
Union, where convergence among the Member States is a fundamental precondition for the European 
Union integration. When analyzing the convergence, the existing literature focuses mostly on per capita 
income or other related income or productivity measures (Carvalho and Harvey, 2005; Pesaran, 2007; 
Simionescu, 2015). However, this concept can be applied to other labor market indicators and other 
markets as such.   
After the financial crisis, the labor market, as the prevailing adjustment mechanism, was recognized as 
the reason for the EU not functioning as the optimal currency area (Eichhorst et al., 2010). Namely, 
labor mobility requires that job seekers move to other countries and provide labor market long-run 
adjustment. This should ensure convergence of unemployment rates within the EU (Blanchard and Katz, 
1992). However, a return to the natural level of unemployment did not occur (European Commission, 
2015). Therefore, in this paper, we put the focus on the role of labor markets in further EU integration 
and concentrate on labor market institutions convergence, an issue that has not been tackled in the 
existing literature.  
Johnson and Papageorgiou (2018) emphasized the importance of the political implications of 
convergence. Namely, only under the assumption of the existence of a single steady-state, small-scale 
interventions can be useful in accelerating the catching-up of poorer countries and moving from one 
group of convergence to another. If there are multiple steady states, then extensive political interventions 
are needed. 
The literature has analyzed convergence using different macroeconomic indicators. Dvoroková (2014) 
analyses the impact of the financial crisis on the real convergence among the EU member states and 
highlights that the process of economic convergence has been undoubtedly marked by the financial 
crisis. For such assessment, concepts of beta and sigma convergence are applied. Results show that in 
the period 2001-2012, beta-convergence between the EU Member States can be confirmed. In other 
words, initially poorer countries showed a higher average rate of economic growth than initially richer 
states. The author highlights that this fact demonstrates the high economic growth in Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, and Romania. On the other hand, a weak economic growth rate was typical for Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. Finally, the author concludes that thanks to the economic development, 
beta convergence among EU countries occurred. 
On the other hand, Estrada, Galí, and López-Salido (2013) examined the patterns of convergence and 
divergence in unemployment rates, inflation, relative prices, and current account balances among euro 
area countries. Authors report that the first nine years of EMU were associated with a strong converge 
in unemployment rates across euro area countries. However, this process was interrupted and reversed 
during the crisis. Authors also highlight that during the last recession, the EMU has not prevented a 
large surge in the dispersion of unemployment rates within the euro area. Also, such an increase in 
dispersion was much larger across the EA countries than for non-EA countries. Authors identify three 
possible reasons for factors behind those large differences in unemployment rates: common currency, 
lack of country-specific monetary policies, or stabilizing risk-sharing devices to accommodate country-
specific shocks. 
Similarly, Raguž Krištić, Rogić Dumančić, and Arčabić (2019) analyze unemployment rates in the euro 
area (EA) countries to test for EA-related benefits and economic integration of the EA in the form of 
lower unemployment rates and unemployment rates convergence. The results imply a certain degree of 
unemployment hysteresis in the EA and support the stochastic convergence of the majority of EA 
countries. However, results imply that EA membership is not a sufficient condition for stochastic 
convergence. Authors conclude that although providing initial benefits, EA is not functioning as an 
optimal currency area. Related to these findings, this paper shows that differences between 
unemployment and employment rates in EU member states arise from a lack of convergence in labor 
market institutions among EU countries, which makes further economic integration difficult.  
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Unemployment rates are also analyzed in Bayer and Juessen (2007). Authors test the convergence 
hypothesis of regional unemployment rates in Germany. The results of univariate tests suggest that 
changes in regional unemployment differences are persistent in Germany. However, more powerful 
panel tests imply that regional unemployment rates converge. Authors argue that such tests identify a 
moderate speed of convergence at best. Because of a structural break followed by the second oil crisis, 
authors use tests that allow such a break. After such adjustment, authors report convergence and quick 
adjustment to an equilibrium distribution of regional unemployment rates.  
Monfort, Ordóñez, and Sala (2016) investigated the convergence of income inequality, absolute 
redistribution, and unemployment. Authors argue that the economic integration process in Europe has 
not led to real convergence in unemployment and inequality among the European countries. Even though 
it was expected that after years of EU integration, countries would converge to a single cluster, the 
author reports a variety of clubs. In other words, economic integration did not lead to real economic 
convergence, which is consistent with the findings of this paper. In addition, there seem to be prevalent 
differences in the effectiveness of public policies to combat inequality. The lack of convergence between 
EU-28 countries is also found in Simionescu (2015), who analyzed the GDP per capita convergence for 
EU-28 members and for 272 regions corresponding to the NUTS 2 level. The results of the analysis 
imply that at the national level in the period from 1995 to 2012, there are significant differences between 
foundation members and CEEC economies. On the other hand, at the regional level, five convergence 
clubs were identified. Our results also show the existence of some clubs depending on labor market 
indicator.  
Convergence clubs were also found in Bartkowska and Riedl (2012), who analyzed the GDP per capita 
convergence in 206 zones from Western Europe in the period 1990 – 2002. The results strongly support 
the existence of six convergence clubs, explaining their formation by initial levels of GDP per capita 
and human capital. Carvalho and Harvey (2005) formulated the convergence components as a second-
order error correction mechanism in order to ensure that the extracted components change smoothly, 
thereby enabling them to be separated from transitory cycles. The authors found two convergence clubs 
in the Eurozone area for real GDP per capita. One club consists of low-income countries (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain) and the other high-income countries’ club (Austria, Finland, and five core economies). 
Authors report that Ireland seems to follow its own growth path, thus being divergent.  
Fritsche and Kuzin (2011) tested the convergence in several variables: real GDP per capita, productivity, 
unit labor cost, and prices level for 12 countries in the Eurozone over the period of 1960-2006. Authors 
report regional clusters in consumer price level data. Also, the results imply that GDP deflator data and 
unit labor cost data are far less clustered than CPI data. GDP per capita indicates the existence of three 
convergence clubs. And finally, productivity data indicate the existence of a small club including fast-
growing countries and a club consisting of all other countries. The authors explain the formation of 
convergence clubs with spatial distance and economic development differences. 
Our literature summary shows that the existing literature has not analyzed the convergence of labor 
market institutions in the EU countries in a way that consistently connects it with the problems of deeper 
integration of the labor markets. In order to fill that literature gap, the indicators of labor market 
institutions (employment protection legislation, tax wedge, unemployment benefits, active labor market 
policies, and minimum wages) and their impact on the labor market are explained and analyzed in more 
detail below. 
2.2. Labor market institutions and their performance 
Labor market institutions play an important role in further economic integration among EU countries. 
Most new EU countries, which have joined the EU after 2004, had rigid labor market institutions. The 
rigidity of the labor market in these countries was characterized by rigid pay systems and a high degree 
of employment protection legislation (Nesporova, 2002). Therefore, the Commission advised  the new 
member states to lower their tax wedge, remove disincentives in the benefits system, and increase 
spending on active labor market policies, in other words: reform their labor market institutions in order 
to address the poor labor market performance (Ederveen, Thissen, 2007, p. 300). Namely, flexible labor 
markets (such as the US or the UK labor market) can respond much faster and easier to changes in labor 
8 
supply and demand, and it is historically shown that countries with less rigid labor market institutions 
have lower unemployment rates. Therefore, a relatively fast solution has been found for the new EU 
members that were facing high unemployment rates at the time of EU accession. Different reforms of 
the labor market institutions were offered to lower unemployment rates.  
Employment protection legislation (EPL) 
The employment protection legislation index  is an indicator of the level of workers’ protection, which 
quantifies the various actions, costs, restrictions, and deadlines related to the procedure of dismissal and 
hiring of workers. It covers both individual and collective dismissals on regular contracts and the hiring 
of workers on temporary contracts. Rigid EPL may have undesirable effects on the labor market and can 
induce labor market segmentation. Furthermore, strict regulation against dismissals is usually associated 
with low hiring and firing rates, which contribute to higher unemployment rates and longer periods out 
of work for vulnerable groups. 
Employment protection both decreases the flows of workers through the labor market and increases the 
duration of unemployment. This makes for a more stagnant labor market, with a higher proportion of 
long-term unemployed (Blanchard, Wolfers, 2000, p. 12-13; Baker et al., 2004, p. 2). Empirical evidence 
gathered by Cazes et al. (2012) confirms the findings from earlier studies that there is no clear link 
between employment protection legislation and employment levels. Regression analysis provided by 
Lehmann and Muravyev (2012) shows that an increase in the employment protection legislation index 
strongly depresses the employment rate and boosts the youth unemployment rate. Such a result might 
be considered in line with the ‘classical’ explanation that job creation is hindered by too strict 
employment protection, leaving some of the new labor market entrants in the state of unemployment 
(Lehmann and Muravyev, 2012, p. 254). Having no impact on the overall unemployment rate, it might 
additionally imply that strong employment protection pushes workers into unprotected informal 
employment relationships or directly into the informal sector of the economy (Lehmann and Muravyev, 
2012, p. 256). In contrast, some results imply that stricter employment protection significantly lowers 
unemployment (Ederveen, Thissen, 2007, p. 309). This supports the findings of Belot and Van Ours 
(2004) but contradicts the results of some other studies. An implication is that a rigid labor market is not 
necessarily bad for employment (Ederveen, Thissen, 2007, p. 309). Over the 1990s, the introduction of 
economic and social reforms in transition economies resulted in substantial moderation of EPL, partly 
enabled by the weakening of trade union power (Ederveen, Thissen, 2007, p. 305). 
Tax wedge 
The tax wedge measures how much the government seemingly receives as a result of taxing the labor 
income. A tax wedge is a difference between before-tax and after-tax wages. In the majority of 
developed countries, progressive tax systems exist, causing taxes to rise with increasing incomes. The 
decrease in net income may discourage employees to work as much or to find other ways to keep more 
of the income (for example, by using government benefits). In such a situation, the remaining employees 
demand higher wages, causing employers to decrease their hiring rate. 
Taxes play a huge role in the redistribution of income. A higher tax wedge raises the relative 
attractiveness of working in the informal sector (Ederveen, Thissen, 2007, p. 302). The empirical results 
of Ederveen and Thissen (2007) for 20 highly developed OECD countries over the period 1960-1990 
imply that the unemployment rate is positively affected by taxes. Also, labor taxes have a negative effect 
on productivity growth (Anspal, Võrk, 2007). The results of Lehmann and Muravyev analysis also show 
that a one-point rise in the tax wedge will lower the employment rate by roughly a third of a percentage 
point but will not influence any of the unemployment rates (Lehmann and Muravyev, 2012, p. 255). 
Such results suggest that higher labor taxes increase the informal work in transition countries (Lehmann 
and Muravyev, 2012, p. 256).  
Unemployment benefits (passive unemployment policies) 
Unemployment benefit is money that the government regularly pays to unemployed people who are 
looking for a job who are capable of working and available for work but are unable to find suitable 
employment, including persons who had not previously been employed. Together with early retirement 
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benefits, they create two main categories of labor market policy (LMP) supports or passive labor market 
policies (PLMP) (European Commission, 2018). Spending for PLMPs is very often higher than spending 
for active labor market policies (ALMPs). This is generally due to both higher coverage and the cost of 
PLMP. However, the balance between active and passive spending varies substantially across regions. 
In particular, spending in PLMPs represents around 70% of total spending in labor market policies. The 
financing of unemployment benefits and active labor market policies falls largely on taxpayers. The 
unemployment insurance system increases the equilibrium unemployment rate, especially if 
unemployment lasts longer (Blanchard, Wolfers, 2000, p. 12). 
Most of the new East-European governments introduced fairly generous unemployment benefits (both 
in terms of eligibility, levels, and duration). However, at the beginning of the 1990s, unemployment rose 
sharply, and so did the claims on benefits (Ederveen, Thissen, 2007). Regarding the unemployment 
benefit system, some results estimate that the first-year replacement rate has a negative albeit small 
effect on unemployment, whereas a higher duration of entitlement does significantly increases 
unemployment (Ederveen, Thissen, 2007, p. 309). At the same time, generous unemployment benefits 
can raise workers’ reservation wages and reduce job search (Baker et al., 2004, p. 2). 
In the early weeks of the COVID-19 crises, over half of OECD countries took steps to improve 
accessibility and/or generosity of “first-tier” unemployment insurance or “second-tier” unemployment 
assistance benefits. According to the OECD Employment Outlook 2020, sixteen OECD countries 
widened access to unemployment insurance benefits by reducing or entirely waiving minimum-
contribution requirements, extending the qualification period for the employment requirements, or 
covering groups that had previously not been entitled (OECD, 2020, p. 67). Twelve OECD countries 
have lengthened the maximum possible duration of unemployment benefit payments, and ten OECD 
countries temporarily increased benefit levels (OECD, 2020, p. 67) in order to preserve the social and 
income security of the individuals. 
Active labor market policies  
The main objective of ALMPs is to increase the employment opportunities for job seekers and to 
improve matching between jobs (vacancies) and workers (i.e., the unemployed). ALMPs range from 
institutional and workplace training offers over indirect employment incentives (job-retainment, job-
sharing, recruitment subsidy) to the setting up of protected and supported employment or direct job 
creation (public work schemes) and start-up incentives. In doing so, ALMPs can contribute to 
employment and GDP growth and reduce unemployment and benefit dependency. 
There are many studies discussing the influence of active labor market policies and minimum wages. 
The regression results by Ederveen and Thissen (2007) show that active labor market policies 
significantly decrease unemployment. Lehmann and Muravyev (2012) find that expenditures on ALMP 
do not affect the employment rate, but they strongly decrease the youth unemployment rate. Active labor 
market policies also have a positive effect on productivity growth (Anspal and Võrk, 2007). 
On the other hand, government mandated active labor market policies might also raise labor costs and 
reduce hiring. If these components of the social protection system are too protective, poorly designed, 
or poorly matched with one another, they could have substantial negative effects on employment 
opportunities (Baker et al., 2004, p. 2). An increase in ALMP would have a stronger effect on reducing 
unemployment in a more employment-friendly institutional environment. Overall, these results provide 
some evidence in favor of the hypothesis on institutional complementarities (Lehmann and Muravyev, 
2012, p. 260). 
Minimum wages 
Minimum wages have been defined as “the minimum amount of payment that an employer is required 
to pay wage earners for the work performed during a given period, which cannot be reduced by collective 
agreement or an individual contract” (ILO, 2014). The purpose of minimum wages is to protect workers 
against improperly low pay and ensure that a country's working population does not fall below the 
poverty line. As the price of goods rises, so should the minimum wage. As a result, too high a minimum 
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wage could lead to increasing unemployment among the low-skilled who are exempted from the 
minimum wage. 
In line with theoretical predictions, minimum wages (measured as a percentage of median wages) 
significantly raise unemployment. The estimated coefficient implies that increasing the minimum wage 
relative to the median wage by 1% results in 1.4% more unemployment (Ederveen, Thissen, 2007, p. 
310). Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) conclude that labor market institutions affect the composition of 
the unemployed, thus affecting the effects of unemployment back on wages. For example, a high 
minimum wage can both increase the effect of adverse shocks on the unemployment rate of the less-
educated workers and - because the minimum wage is fixed - reduce the effect of unemployment on 
wages (Blanchard, Wolfers, 2000, p. 18). 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
The data set for this study covers 28 EU member states over the period of 1993-2018, depending on the 
data availability. The initial data set is an unbalanced panel. The model used in empirical analysis, 
namely the log-t regression, requires strongly balanced panel data. To accommodate it, we were forced 
to drop countries and/or time periods with missing data from the analysis. Therefore, a list of countries 
and time periods slightly varies across different labor market institutions indicators. We list them in 
Appendix Table A1. Appendix Table A2 provides descriptive statistics of all variables. Appendix Figure 
A1 plots time series. 
The employment protection legislation index (EPL) is collected from OECD Employment Database. It 
evaluates the regulations on the dismissal of workers on regular contracts and the hiring of workers on 
temporary contracts. They cover both individual and collective dismissals.  
We also consider tax wedge, unemployment benefits, active labor market policies, and minimum wages, 
which are collected from the Eurostat Database. Tax wedge on labor costs is defined as income tax on 
gross wage earnings plus the employee's and the employer's social security contributions, expressed as 
a percentage of the total labor costs of the earner. Unemployment benefits are out-of-work income 
maintenance and support in the percentage of GDP received by registered unemployed. Active labor 
market policies present total labor market policy measures expenditures in the percentage of GDP. The 
annual minimum wage is in the percentage of GDP per capita. 
3.2. Methodology 
For measuring convergence, we employ standard beta and sigma convergence, which we complement 
with a more sophisticated and more flexible approach of log-t regression proposed by Phillips and Sul 
(2007, 2009). Standard beta and sigma convergence tests may be biased and have low power, as shown 
in Bernard and Durlauf (1995, 1996). The log-t test fixes these issues, and it is preferred over beta and 
sigma convergence test.  
The simplest approach to measuring convergence is sigma convergence. Sigma convergence is simply 
calculated as a cross-sectional standard deviation of all analyzed countries. Convergence is observed 
when cross-sectional dispersion decreases over time, or more formally when: 
𝜎𝑡 < 𝜎𝑡0 (1) 
where 𝜎 is a cross-sectional standard deviation and index 𝑡0 indicates the first observable period. We 
compute sigma convergence for each labor market institutions indicator.  
Beta convergence appears when countries with lower starting position grow faster. In other words, there 
must be a negative relationship between the initial level and growth rate of labor market institutions 
indicators. The concept of sigma convergence is closely related to the concept of beta convergence, as 
the decrease in dispersion requires that countries with lower levels grow faster and catch up with other 
countries. We estimate the following conditional beta convergence model: 
𝛥5𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡−5 + 𝛾1𝛥𝑁𝑖𝑡−5 + 𝛾2𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−5 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (2) 
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where Δ5𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents a five-year overlapping growth rate of particular labor market institutions 
indicator, 𝑥𝑖𝑡−5 is the initial level of the same indicator, and we control the model for initial growth rates 
of employment (Δ𝑁𝑡−5) and GDP (𝑦𝑖𝑡−5). We estimate the same model for all labor market institutions 
indicators. This model measures conditional convergence, as the model controls for growth rates of 
employment and GDP. Convergence is observed when the estimated 𝛽 is negative and statistically 
significant.  
Equation (2) is a version of the dynamic panel data model, as shown in Caselli et al. (1996) and Bond 
et al. (2001). Caselli et al. (1996) and Bond et al. (2001) suggest using GMM estimation for such growth 
equations, and we use system GMM estimation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998), which is preferred in this case (see Bond et al., 2001). The basic idea is to estimate a 
system of equations in both first-differences and levels, where the instruments for the level equation are 
lagged first-differences of the series. We use two-step estimation and robust standard errors. The fixed 
effects are removed by first differencing instead of forward orthogonal deviation, as panel data are 
strongly balanced.  
Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) developed relative transitions curves and log-t test for convergence which, 
combined with a clustering algorithm, can endogenously determine convergence clubs. Their method 
builds upon a neoclassical growth model and provides the necessary flexibility to accommodate 
heterogeneous technology in growth models. In essence, the model tests for a decrease in cross-sectional 
dispersion over time, which suggests convergence. 
Suppose a neoclassical growth model such as one used in Phillips and Sul (2009): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ?̃?𝑖
⋆ + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑖0 + [𝑙𝑜𝑔 ?̃?𝑖0 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ?̃?𝑖
⋆]𝑒−𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑡 (3) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is output per capita with its initial (?̃?𝑖0) and steady-state levels (?̃?𝑖
∗) and 𝐴𝑖0 represents the 
initial level of technology. Convergence parameter 𝛽𝑖𝑡 and output growth rate 𝑔𝑖𝑡 are allowed to vary 
over time and across countries, capturing heterogeneity. The model can be rewritten as: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝜇𝑡
) 𝜇𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝜇𝑡 (4) 
where the term 𝑎𝑖𝑡 captures all right-hand side variables from equation (3) except 𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑡. Equation (4) is 
a form of the dynamic factor model, which consists of a common component 𝜇𝑡 shared by all countries, 
and country-specific factor loading 𝑏𝑖𝑡 showing a share of a common trend for each EU country. In our 
paper, the common component captures EU institutions, EU wide policies, and other political and trade 
factors shared by all countries. On the other hand, factor loading 𝑏𝑖𝑡 is a key coefficient showing how 
important is the common component for individual countries.  
Relative transition curves are used for empirical analysis of factor loadings 𝑏𝑖𝑡. They are computed as 
















Where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents each of our five labor market institutions indicators, and we analyze them 
separately. Countries converge when relative transition curves approach unity. We apply Hodrick and 
Prescott (1997) filter (HP) and use trend series to remove cyclical components, as suggested by Phillips 
and Sul (2009).  
Relative transition curves are a very flexible tool for analyzing convergence, as they allow for all 
possible paths over time and only require that curves approach unity. However, they are not a formal 
way of analyzing convergence, as they only allow a visual inspection. Still, relative transition curves 











Now, countries converge when 𝐻𝑡 approaches zero over time. Phillips and Sul (2007) develop a log-t 




− 2 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑡) = 𝑎 + 𝛾 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (7) 
Term 2 log(log 𝑡) is a penalty function and its function is to improve test performance. Term 𝑢𝑡 is an 
iid error. Convergence is tested with the γ coefficient. Negative and statistically significant 𝛾 implies 
divergence. If 0 ≤ 𝛾 < 2, there is a conditional convergence in growth rates. For absolute convergence 
to hold 𝛾 ≥ 2.  The critical value at 5% level of significance is ±1.65. As suggested by Phillips and Sul 
(2007, 2009), we remove the cyclical component from the data using HP filter, and we discard the first 
third of initial observations.1 
We determine endogenous convergence clubs based on the log-t regression and the accompanying 
clustering algorithm proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009). Club convergence can be tested when 
there is no convergence in the full sample of countries. In the first step of the algorithm, countries are 
sorted in the panel in descending order. In the second step, a core group of countries is formed based on 
the highest value of t-statistics, which must be greater than −1.65. The remaining countries form a 
complementary group, and in the third step, one by one country is added to the core group and is tested 
for convergence. The country is added to the core group if the t-statistics is greater than −1.65. When 
all countries that satisfy the condition are added to the core group, the first club is formed. In the fourth 
step, the log-t test is applied to the group of remaining complementary countries. If the t-statistic is 
greater than −1.65, the second convergence club is identified. If not, steps (1) to (3) are repeated on the 
group of remaining countries to identify other convergence clubs. Each club must have at least two 
countries. At the end of the algorithm, it is possible that some countries do not converge to any other 
country. Such remaining countries form a diverging group.  
When initial clubs are identified, we test them for merging by applying the log-t test on them again. 
Club 1 and club 2 are merged if we cannot reject convergence between them. Then they form a new 
club 1, which is then tested for merging with club 3 and so on. Arčabić (2018) showed there is a trade-
off between the number of clubs and the statistical significance of estimated clubs when clubs are 
merged. We opt for fewer clubs and merge them, but the results do not change much. We report only 
the results of merged clubs, while the full results are available upon request. 
We also test for convergence in exogenously defined clubs. In that case, we apply the log-t regression 
on predetermined clubs without the clustering algorithm.  
4. Results 
Results are organized as follows. We first present results on the absolute and conditional convergence 
between EU countries in section 4.1. Simple sigma and conditional beta convergence tests are 
considered, as well as the log-t regression. The main conclusion is there is no conditional convergence 
between EU member states. Next, in section 4.2., we discuss results on the club convergence, allowing 
for the possibility that EU member states converge in different clubs. We consider five clubs based on 
the literature: Mediterranean, Continental, Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and Eastern. We call these clubs 
exogenous, and we apply the log-t regression on each of these clubs. Furthermore, we also analyze 
endogenous clubs based on the Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) clustering algorithm and compare the 
results. We conclude there is limited evidence of club convergence, as it depends on the labor market 
institutions indicator and group of countries. 
                                                                        
1 See Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) for full technical details. In the empirical analysis, we use procedures provided by Du 
(2017). See Arčabić (2018) for empirical application to fiscal convergence and sustainability 
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4.1. Absolute and conditional convergence of labor market institutions 
Figure 1 shows the results of simple sigma convergence for five labor market institutions indicators. 
The results are mixed with consecutive periods of convergence and divergence. Sigma convergence is 
computed as cross-sectional standard deviation where the decrease in dispersion indicates convergence. 
The employment protection legislation index from Figure 1(a) shows mainly constant standard deviation 
from 1993 to 2009 and substantial decrease after 2010, which coincidence with the Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis when most countries experience a drop in employment protection legislation. Similarly, the 
tax wedge (Figure 1b) and minimum wages (Figure 1e) also show more prominent signs of sigma 
convergence after 2010. On the other hand, passive and active labor market policies (Figures 1c and 1d) 
experience divergence during the Global financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. However, 
before and after the crises, we observe patterns of convergence. Therefore, both indicators show a 
reclined-S pattern during the 2005-2017 period. In sum, we do not find obvious evidence of convergence 
in labor market institutions, as the results are mixed.  
These results are mainly confirmed when we use more sophisticated methods, such as conditional beta 
convergence and log-t test. Simply put, we do not find strong evidence of conditional convergence 
between all EU member states. Table 1 presents the results of the conditional beta convergence from the 
dynamic panel data model. Each column shows convergence results for a single labor market institutions 
indicator. The dependent variable is an overlapping five-year growth rate, while the key independent 
variable is the initial level of the indicator. We control all models with the growth rate of employment 
and GDP. As usual, convergence is present when there is a negative relationship between the growth 
rate and the initial level of the indicator.  
Only active labor market policy indicator shows statistically significant convergence with the estimated 
coefficient of −0.518, while other labor market institutions indicators are statistically equal to zero. GDP 
growth is significant in models (2), (3), and (5), while employment growth is only significant in the case 
of model (2). Test statistics is displayed at the bottom of Table 1. The F-test suggests a poor performance 
of models (1) and (2), which is in line with the obtained results. The Hansen's test for overidentification 
suggests that instruments are robust, and we keep the number of instruments below the number of 
countries in the model. 
Analyzing beta convergence using dynamic panel data is useful for analyzing conditional convergence 
within the EU. However, it is difficult to use the same model for analyzing club convergence. Simply 
put, clubs can be rather small, consisting of only two countries. Such small clubs are not convenient to 
analyze using dynamic panel data, and some other methods should be employed. We resolve this issue 
by using relative transition curves and log-t test by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009). 
Lack of conditional convergence in labor market institutions is confirmed with relative transition paths 
and more formal log-t regression proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009). Figure 2 shows relative 
transition curves, which should approach unity when there is convergence. However, it is clear that the 
curves are equally scattered at the beginning and the end of the sample for all five variables, indicating 
a lack of convergence. On each plot in Figure 2, we show countries with the biggest relative departure 
from the mean. Portugal and the UK have the highest and the lowest employment protection legislation, 
respectively (Figure 2a). Likewise, the tax wedge is the highest in Belgium and the lowest in Ireland 
(Figure 2b). Figure 2(c) shows that France has the highest unemployment benefits, while on the other 
hand, the lowest benefits are in Slovakia and Romania. Active labor market policies are the highest in 
Denmark but the lowest in Estonia and Romania (Figure 2d). Finally, countries with the highest (lowest) 
minimum wages are Malta and France (Czechia and Luxembourg), as shown in Figure 2(e). 
The log-t regression results are presented in Table 2. Results for all EU countries are in the second 
column, and convergence is strongly rejected for all five variables, as indicated in the table. This 
formally confirms the visual inspection of relative transition curves. In conclusion, different 
convergence tests provide mixed results, but a more formal analysis gives a firm conclusion that labor 
market institutions do not converge within the European Union. The differences between institutions 
are still substantial, and the labor market institutions are changing too slowly to converge. 
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4.2. Club convergence of labor market institutions 
Lack of convergence within all EU member states opens a question of club convergence. We consider 
two types of clubs; endogenous clubs based on Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) clustering algorithm and 
exogenous clubs based on geographical proximity and labor market similarities. Club convergence is 
indirectly related to discussions on the EU core and periphery or divisions in old and new EU member 
states. Therefore, it is expected to find groups of countries with similar characteristics.  
Table 2 presents the results of the clustering algorithm. For each labor market institution indicator, we 
find two or more clubs. Countries that form each convergence club are presented in Figure 3. As 
elaborated in the methodology section, log-t regression shows divergence when γ is negative. If 0≤γ<2, 
there is conditional convergence in growth rates, and for γ≥2, there is an absolute convergence. The 
critical value for the t-test on the γ coefficient is ±1.65.  
For labor market institutions indicators, employment protection legislation, and tax wedge, we find three 
clubs and also one divergent group. In both cases, the first club is the biggest one and contains more 
than half countries. The second club is smaller, and the third club is the smallest. Tax wedge divergent 
group contains Denmark and Poland, which do not converge to any club. Looking at the estimated log-
t coefficient, only the third club is statistically significant, showing strong convergence. This club is also 
expected and can be declared as an Anglo-Saxon club, as it contains the UK and Ireland, plus the 
Netherlands when the tax wedge is observed (see Figure 3). The other two clubs are only loosely related, 
but there are some overlapping of the countries in the first club. Employment protection legislation Club 
1 contains Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany, but also Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands as well as Italy, Portugal, and Spain, Czechia, and Poland. These countries would be 
typically grouped in three or four different clubs, such as continental, Scandinavian, Mediterranean, and 
Eastern. Therefore, countries that form the first and the second club are very heterogeneous, and they 
seem to converge to some other criteria than simple geographical, political, or development similarities. 
It is also possible that their convergence is due to multiple criteria, but the factors that affect club 
formation are beyond the scope of this paper. We also stress that the estimated convergence coefficient 
is statistically insignificant, which suggests only weak convergence between countries.  
Active and passive labor market policies also show evidence of club convergence, and we observe some 
similarities in club formation between the two labor market institution indicators. There are five 
convergence clubs for unemployment benefits plus Belgium, which does not converge to any club. 
However, only the third club shows statistically significant convergence, while in others, the estimated 
γ coefficient is statistically equal to zero, again suggesting weak convergence. On the other hand, the 
active labor market policies index shows four convergence clubs, and all of them are highly statistically 
significant. The divergent group, in this case, consists of Denmark and Romania. Countries in the active 
labor market policy Club 4 are comparable to countries in unemployment benefits Club 3. Again, 
countries that form both clubs are heterogeneous. In both clubs, we find Germany on the one hand, and 
Greece, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia on the other hand. These countries 
have substantially different labor markets, especially when Germany and Greece are compared. 
Therefore, countries in the clubs are not intuitively related, and we can conclude that convergence clubs 
do not share common geographical, political, or development similarities as commonly expected.   
A similar conclusion holds for convergence clubs in minimum wages. We find two clubs that show 
strong signs of convergence, as the estimated γ-s are positive and statistically significant. Countries that 
form clubs are again heterogeneous. Even the UK and Ireland are grouped in two different clubs, which 
is not the case with other variables.  
Next, we turn to the issue of club convergence, where clubs are exogenous and based on the literature. 
We form five different clubs based on geographical proximity and labor market similarities. These are 
the Mediterranean, Continental, Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and Eastern. A full list of countries and 
their characteristics in each of these clubs is provided in Appendix Table A3 (see more in Obadić, 2012). 
EU member states have different approaches to labor market institutions, and the application of 
flexibility and security forms the concept of flexicurity. In doing so, they often use quite different 
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policies and tools to ensure flexicurity. The balance between these two elements requires fairly different 
interventions due to the specificity of the starting points. Moreover, according to the Common Principles 
of Flexicurity, each Member State can follow its own path of flexicurity, which reflects national 
specificities and establishes its own forms of economic and social regulation (European Foundation, 
2008). 
According to the results obtained by cluster analysis in the literature (Gaard, 2005; European 
Commission, 2006; Muffels and Luijkx, 2008), countries may be classified into five different clusters 
or clubs. As they are mainly grouped according to flexibility and security labor market characteristics, 
it is possible to differentiate between five flexicurity policy/institutional features. Selected European 
countries are clustered into five groups or clubs based on estimates of national flexicurity characteristics 
(Table A3 in Appendix).  
Mediterranean countries are characterized by low to average unemployment benefits, strict availability 
for work requirements, passive labor market policies, and high employment protection legislation. 
Countries that form that club are Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. On the other 
hand, the Continental club consists of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Slovenia. 
The continental club is characterized by generous unemployment benefits, varying demand of 
availability, passive labor market policies, and average to high employment protection legislation. 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Finland form the Scandinavian club. This club is characterized 
by high unemployment benefits, strict availability for work requirements, active labor market policies, 
and low to average employment protection legislation. Ireland and the UK form Anglo-Saxon club 
characterized by low unemployment benefits, few formal demands on availability, small share of active 
labor market policies, and weak employment protection legislation. Finally, the Eastern European club 
consists of Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. It 
is characterized by low unemployment benefits, varying demand of availability, active labor market 
policies, and low to average employment protection legislation.  
It can be concluded that the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries have the best position given that they 
simultaneously achieve a high level of flexibility and job security. Mediterranean and continental 
countries as regulated systems of flexicurity have worse systems. 
Results on the convergence of exogenous clubs are presented in Table 3, where we apply the log-t test 
to each club. We provide γ coefficient and the accompanying t-statistics. When the t-statistics is lower 
than the critical value of −1.65, we reject the convergence hypothesis, which is marked with an asterisk. 
It is easy to observe that convergence is rejected in almost all clubs except Anglo-Saxon club for EPL 
index and tax wedge and Mediterranean club for tax wedge and minimum wages. The convergence of 
the Anglo-Saxon club is comparable with our results from endogenous club convergence. Other results 
suggest that commonly observed clubs based on geographical proximity and labor market similarities 
do not actually converge and should be revised.  
In conclusion, the results suggest a lack of convergence of labor market institutions at the EU level. 
Also, there are different convergence clubs depending on the labor market institution indicator. 
Convergence clubs imply different long-run steady states where the differences between countries may 
be substantial. Labor market institutions are fundamental determinants of employment and 
unemployment. Differences we find in labor market institutions suggest that levels of employment and 
unemployment in the EU will hardly converge, implying weak labor market integration. In this way, our 
results just confirm the findings of Baker et al. (2004) and Cazes et al. (2012), who conclude that it is 
difficult to assess the impact of individual labor market institutions since they are often inconclusive 
and vary from country to country. Further on, Cazes et al. (2012) conclude that irrespective of the 
methodology used, that the magnitude and direction of the impact of stringency of labor legislation on 
employment and unemployment are rather mixed (Cazes et al., 2012, p. 37). 
Figure 4 shows that the results of the log-t test are comparable with the beta convergence concept. Figure 
4 shows scatter diagrams for five labor market institutions indicators with the initial level of the indicator 
on the horizontal axis and growth rate between the first and the last period on the vertical axis. This is 
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equivalent to beta convergence of the form 1 𝑇⁄ · [(𝑦𝑖𝑇 − 𝑦𝑖1) 𝑦𝑖1]⁄ = 𝑐 + 𝛽𝑦𝑖1 + 𝑒𝑖 where the 
dependent variable is the growth rate regressed on the initial level of the variable.  
In Figure 4, we plot the initial level and the growth rate of each endogenously estimated club to relate 
club convergence obtain from log-t regression with the beta convergence concept. A negative slope in 
the scatter diagram suggests the existence of beta convergence.  
Results for the employment protection legislation from Figure 4(a) show that all three clubs have a 
negative slope of the regression line, suggesting beta convergence. The dispersion in the first club is 
somewhat bigger due to Spain and Portugal, which are farther away from other countries. However, 
Club 1 is also the largest club, and the dispersion is not unexpected.  
Tax wedge clubs from Figure 4(b) also show clear signs of beta convergence, except in the case of the 
second club, where we observe substantial dispersion and the horizontal regression line. Unemployment 
benefits are plotted in Figure 4(c), where we find five clubs. All clubs show beta convergence except 
Club 2, which consists of Denmark and Portugal. Active labor market policies and minimum wages 
(Figure 4(d) and 4(e), respectively) are compatible with the beta convergence concept, as all clubs have 
a negative slope of the regression line. These clubs converge according to log-t regression and are 
statistically significant, which is in line with the low dispersion evident from Figure 4(d) and 4(e).  
5. Conclusion 
Since the introduction of the single currency, the main focus of many economists, politicians, and the 
public was on the success and future of the EU integration and how successful the EU was in functioning 
as the optimal currency area. As expected, the early research focused on monetary policy and its role in 
this process. However, the recent global financial crisis has shown that a system has been created with 
a fault, and the reasons for difficult integration have become increasingly sought in the different 
functioning of the labor markets among the EU member states. Eichhorst et al. (2010) highlight that the 
labor market functioning is the prevailing adjustment mechanism that, after the financial crisis, was 
recognized as the reason for the EU not functioning as the optimal currency area. This raises the question 
of why return to the natural level of production, employment, and unemployment did not occur in many 
EU countries (European Commission, 2015).  
In addition, the success of the EU itself can best be measured through the degree of market integration 
of its member states. In this context, the fundamental task of the EU economic policymakers is to achieve 
and then accelerate convergence among EU member states. This mainly refers to the reduction of 
differences in living standards and working conditions. When analyzing the convergence, the existing 
literature focused mostly on the main macroeconomic variables such as income and productivity 
(Carvalho and Harvey, 2005; Pesaran, 2007; Simionescu, 2015), or prices, unemployment, and 
employment (Estrada, Galí, and López-Salido, 2013).  
This paper takes a step further by focusing on the role of the labor market institutions convergence in 
further EU integration, which is not present in the existing literature. This paper considers five labor 
market institutions indicators: employment protection legislation index (EPL), tax wedge, 
unemployment benefits, active labor market policies, and minimum wages. 
We test the convergence in labor market institutions among the EU countries using standard beta and 
sigma convergence and recently developed the log-t test by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009). Depending 
on the data availability, the period from 1993 to 2018 has been analyzed. We also investigate if the EU 
member states converge in different clubs. Two types of clubs are considered: endogenous clubs based 
on Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) clustering algorithm and exogenous clubs based on geographical 
proximity and labor market similarities. Exogenous clubs consist of five different clubs based on 
geographical proximity and labor market similarities: Mediterranean, Continental, Scandinavian, 
Anglo-Saxon and Eastern. 
Results on the absolute and conditional convergence between the EU member states can be summarized 
as follows. The results of simple sigma convergence for five labor market institutions indicators are 
mixed with consecutive periods of convergence and divergence. Therefore, we do not find obvious 
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evidence of convergence in labor market institutions. These findings are confirmed when we apply 
conditional beta convergence and log-t test. The main conclusion of the first part of the analysis is that 
labor market institutions do not converge within the European Union. The differences between such 
institutions are still significant, and they slow down the labor market institution convergence. 
The second part of our research analyzed club convergence of labor market institutions. The results of 
the clustering algorithm based on Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) find two or more endogenous clubs for 
each labor market institution indicator. We find three clubs in employment protection legislation and 
tax wedge. When analyzing active and passive labor market policies, they also show evidence of club 
convergence. Passive labor market policies measured with unemployment benefits show five clubs, but 
only the third club shows statistically significant convergence. Furthermore, the active labor market 
policies index shows four convergence clubs, and all of them are highly statistically significant. 
Convergence clubs are heterogeneous, and they do not share common geographical, political, or 
development similarities as commonly expected when analyzing the literature. All these conclusions are 
also valid for convergence clubs in minimum wages, where we find two clubs that show strong signs of 
convergence. Finally, the results of exogenous clubs grouped as the Mediterranean, Continental, 
Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and Eastern European clubs do not show convergence. We can easily reject 
convergence in all clubs except Anglo-Saxon club for EPL index and tax wedge and Mediterranean club 
for tax wedge and minimum wages. Furthermore, the convergence of the Anglo-Saxon club is 
comparable with obtained results from endogenous club convergence. For the rest of the clubs, based 
on geographical proximity and labor market similarities, we can conclude that they do not converge.  
There are some important implications of our study for the economic policy. Labor market institutions 
are fundamental determinants of employment and unemployment performance, and the lack of 
convergence that we find in labor market institutions suggest that levels of employment and 
unemployment in the EU will hardly converge, implying weak labor market integration. As long as EU 
labor market characteristics are different at the core of their functioning, member states' adjustment is 
difficult, and countries will adapt differently to shocks, as the recent financial crisis has clearly shown. 













Table 1. Beta convergence results based on panel data models  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      
Employment protection  0.404     
legislation (t−5) (0.62)     
Tax wedge (t−5)  0.113    
  (0.15)    
Unemployment benefits    0.184   
(t−5)   (0.16)   
Active labor market     -0.518**  
policies (t−5)    (0.24)  
Minimum wages (t−5)     -0.019 
     (0.14) 
      
∆ Employment (t−5) 0.024 0.254** -0.017 0.007 -0.062 
 (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.21) 
∆ GDP (t−5) -0.024 -0.131** 0.034*** -0.001 0.203** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
Constant -0.949 -4.297 -0.245* 0.209* 0.385 
 (1.48) (5.66) (0.13) (0.10) (5.12) 
      
Observations 247 322 192 184 266 
Number of id 18 23 24 23 19 
F-test 0.467 0.168 0.009 0.023 0.022 
# of instruments 16 22 22 22 19 
Sargan test 0.553 0.911 5.65e-09 0.438 0.713 
Hansen test 0.446 0.371 0.289 0.308 0.514 
AR(2) 0.029 0.020 0.806 0.125 0.006 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The model is estimated with System-GMM.  
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Table 2. Results of the log-t test for convergence and endogenous clubs 
(a) EPL index 









   
Coeff -0.408* -0.0450 0.0700 1.334    
t-stat -7.923 -0.426 0.487 3.573    
        
(b) Tax wedge  









  Group 
[2] 
Coeff -0.683* -0.132 0.0790 0.768   -4.152* 
t-stat -21.12 -1.621 0.477 7.192   -6.890 
        
(c) Unemployment benefits 















Coeff -1.211* 0.0450 -2.534 0.162 0.585 -1.951 - 
t-stat -94.88 0.284 -1.131 6.604 1.642 -1.082 - 
        
(d) Active labor market policies 













Coeff -1.289* 0.407 1.021 0.571 0.416  -1.117* 
t-stat -63.21 6.657 35.67 2.394 4.574  -36.53 
        
(e) Minimum wages 







    
Coeff -0.381* 0.273 1.005     
t-stat -8.436 3.042 4.275     
Note: * represents a rejection of convergence at the 5% level. The numbers in brackets show a number of countries in the club. Only results of 
final classification after club merging are presented. Countries that form different clubs are presented in Figure 3. Group indicates a divergent 
group of countries.  
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Table 3. Results of the log-t test for convergence among exogenous clubs 
(a) EPL index 
      
log(t) Mediterranean Continental Scandinavian Anglo-Saxon Eastern 
Coeff -0.271* -0.290* -0.716* 1.334 -0.643* 
t-stat -3.426 -27.49 -14.54 3.573 -27.33 
      
(b) Tax wedge 
      
log(t) Mediterranean Continental Scandinavian Anglo-Saxon Eastern 
Coeff 0.682 -0.192* -1.206* 3.081 -1.266* 
t-stat 3.315 -2.802 -22.77 5.914 -34.21 
      
(c) Unemployment benefits 
      
log(t) Mediterranean Continental Scandinavian Anglo-Saxon Eastern 
Coeff -0.800* -1.411* -2.421* n/a -1.893* 
t-stat -15.87 -21.35 -170.4 n/a -16.60 
      
(d) Active labor market policies 
      
log(t) Mediterranean Continental Scandinavian Anglo-Saxon Eastern 
Coeff -0.133* -1.722* -2.035* n/a -1.956* 
t-stat -1.765 -12.34 -138.7 n/a -99.66 
      
(e) Minimum wages 
      
log(t) Mediterranean Continental Scandinavian Anglo-Saxon Eastern 
Coeff 0.221 -0.907* n/a -6.177* -0.899* 
t-stat 1.330 -258.5 n/a -6.380 -77.11 
Note: * represents a rejection of convergence at the 5% level. Countries that form clubs are listed in Appendix Table A3.
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Figures 
Figure 1. Sigma convergence results 
(a) EPL index (b) Tax wedge 
 
(c) Unemployment benefits (d) Active labor market policies 
 




Figure 2. Relative transition paths 
(a) EPL index (b) Tax wedge 
 
(c) Unemployment benefits (d) Active labor market policies 
 
(e) Minimum wages 
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Figure 3. Convergence clubs 
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Figure 4. Beta convergence within clubs 
(a) EPL index (b) Tax wedge (c) Unemployment benefits 
 
(d) Active labor market policies (e) Minimum wages  
 
APPENDIX A: Data sample and descriptive statistics 
Table A1. List of countries for each labor market institutions indicator 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics of main variables 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # of observations 
  
     
EPL index overall 2.44 .69 1.09 4.58 N=378 
 between  .69 1.19 4.37 n=18 
 within  .16 1.25 3.55 T=21 
       
Tax wedge overall 38.61 6.38 20.70 51.40 N=437 
 between  6.25 23.70 49.58 n=23 
 within  1.81 32.92 45.84 T=19 
       
Unemp. Benefits overall .86 .64 .05 3.08 N=312 
 between  .58 .19 2.17 n=24 
 within  .28 .02 2.02 T=13 
       
ALMP overall .44 .30 .02 1.42 N=299 
 between  .29 .04 1.27 n=23 
 within  .10 .11 .80 T=13 
       
Min. wage overall 37.78 9.26 19.94 56.01 N=361 
 between  8.75 25.62 52.66 n=19 
 within  3.60 24.66 46.90 T=19 
 
Table A3. List of countries in exogenous clubs and characteristics of their labor market 
policies 






























• Low to average 
unemployment 
benefits 
• Strict availability for 
work requirements 
• Passive LMP 




• Varying demand of 
availability 
• Passive LMP 
• Average to high EPL 
• High unemployment 
benefits 
• Strict availability for 
work requirements 
• Active LMP 
• Low to average EPL 
• Low unemployment 
benefits 
• Few formal demands 
on availability 
• A small share of 
active LMP 
• Weak EPL 
• Low unemployment 
benefits 
• Varying demand of 
availability 
• Active LMP 
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